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#### Contention 1: The Wake Up Call

Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (IHRCRC) and Global Justice Clinic (GJC) at NYU School of Law 2012 [February, Living Under Drones, “Victim Stories” http://www.livingunderdrones.org/victim-stories/]

Sadaullah Wazir, teenager, former student from the village of Machi Khel in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, was severely injured in a September 2009 drone strike on hi**s** grandfather’s home.[1] Sadaullah has filed a complaint before the UN Human Rights Council.[2]

“Before the drone strikes started, my life was very good. I used to go to school and I used to be quite busy with that, but after the drone strikes, I stopped going to school now. I was happy because I thought I would become a doctor.” Sadaullah recalled, “Two missiles [were] fired at our hujra and three people died. My cousin and I were injured. We didn’t hear the missile at all and then it was there.” He further explained, “[The last thing I remembered was that] we had just broken our fast where we had eaten and just prayed. . . .We were having tea and just eating a bit and then there were missiles. . . . When I gained consciousness, there was a bandage on my eye. I didn’t know what had happened to my eye and I could only see from one.” Sadaullah lost both of his legs and one of his eyes in the attack. He informed us, “Before [the strike], my life was normal and very good because I could go anywhere and do anything. But now I am not able to do that because I have to stay inside. . . . Sometimes I have really bad headaches. . . . [and] if I walk too much [on my prosthetic legs], my legs hurt a lot. [Drones have] drastically affected life [in our area].”

#### Could you imagine- your first day of college You’re ready to get out and explore campus- you’ve bought all your textbooks in advance. You can’t wait. And then you hear it. The light air plane droning sound of a UAV. Your cortisol levels spike. You sweat. You’ve heard it before. Suddenly, it all changes. You wake up and your head hurts too much to go to school and you drop out.

#### I know, I know – this sounds like a manipulative sob story, but its also more than that because this is how we started to care. Not because we’ve read a bunch of philosophy but because we recognize that this story is not an outlier– there are 3000 or so more. That story only sounds like a sob story because we have a default not to care. Why would something happening to someone else matter? We live in America.

#### More than that – that story asks questions about our vulnerability. What if I was susceptible to violence just because I or Vincent was an Arab adult male in a combat zone? It’s impossible to imagine, but I think that kind of impossibility is important.

#### So how does this happen? Why is the default not to care?

#### Contention 2: The New War

#### Ian Shaw and Majed Akter contend that drone warfare provides the illusion of invulnerability and precision. That allows us to magically strike down our enemies without consequences.

**Shaw and Akhter, 2012** (Ian Graham Ronald, School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, The University of Glasgow and Majed, School of Geography and Development, University of Arizona, “The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan” Antipode, 1500-1

In this sense, the drone is fundamentally a fetishized object. And we mean this in the Marxist sense of the concept—the object’s human relations are mystified and masked—as the drone presents itself to the world as an autonomous agent, isolated from the imperial and military apparatus behind it. Marx used the concept of the fetish in numerous ways to describe the exchange of commodities:

A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour (Marx 1991:28).

The commodity fetish is a two-fold phenomenon: the commodity transcends the labour that produced it and appears as a separate and objectifiable “thing”, and consequently, its social origins are masked as its value appears contained in the “thing-itself”. Power and autonomy are presumed to exist within commodities themselves, rather than within their productive relations. Marx thus argues that the commodity is reified with an almost supernatural and quasi-religious status: “Its analysis shows that it is, in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” (Marx 1991:26). This fetishization extends from commodities into the cultural circuit more generally, as the work of cultural theorists Jameson, Adorno, Benjamin, Baudrillard, and Debord have differently illustrated.

The primary relationship evoked in most discussions of drone warfare is between a drone and its battlefield of objectified targets, rather than the relationship between the team of technicians operating the drone as agents of American empire and the unsuspecting bodies surveilled and slaughtered on the ground in neo-colonial Pakistan. In other words, drone warfare is thought of as a relationship between things, rather than between people. And the supernatural element is never far away. As Colonel Theodore Osowski of the US Air Force reveals in his Biblical allegory on drones: “It’s kind of like having God overhead. And lightning comes down in the form of a Hellfire” (quoted in Mockenhaupt 2009). It is therefore through fetishization that drones bomb sovereign Pakistani territory without the legal and territorial consequences of ground war. Far from “sitting there”, the drone performs the military logic of a “war without the war” to its extreme, which is to say, a war without bodies, a war of machines, and a war of discrete and surgical strikes from the sky.

A critical geography must therefore intervene to dismantle the production and maintenance of the drone fetish; a project allied to the work of feminist geographies and geopolitics that reinsert a disavowed corporeality (England 2003, 2006; Fluri 2009; Hyndman 2001, 2007; Massey 1994; Nicely 2009; Sharp 2007). Indeed, much of the military discourse is molded by the iron cast of paternalism: a feminized FATA “rescued” by masculine US forces—without mention of the human pain and suffering.

Objects, commodities, and technologies have always mattered to the unfolding stories of our lives (Kloppenburg 1988; Latour 1993, 2005; Mintz 1985; Robbins 2007; Schivelbusch 1987; White 1996; Winner 1977), as have their hybrid couplings (Haraway 1991; Whatmore 2006). The key point is that although the drone is capable of reconfiguring political and legal life, it does so through a network. As Latour (2005:56) writes: “An ‘actor’ in the hyphenated expression actor-network is not the source of an action but the moving target of a vast array of entities swarming around it”. In other words, the autonomy and exceptional status of the drone is always-already a production. The Obama administration’s touting of the drone as the “magical solution” to the “war on terror” is a fetishization that occludes its unbearable humanness.

#### We even justify it by pretending that we save lives through precision bombing. This is the triumph of biopolitical calculation by which life is protected by and while killing it.

**Wilcox 2009** [Lauren, Charles and Amy Scharf Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Body Counts: The Politics of Embodiment in Precision Warfare, Political Theory Colloquium]

In discourse of precision warfare, the deaths of civilians occupy a substantial, if not crucial, role. The sparing of civilian lives is given as a key rationale (second only to protecting the lives of servicemen and women) for the development and use of precision munitions. In this way, precision warfare is a key component of the entry of biopolitical rationality into the sphere of war. Foucault considers biopower to be the power “to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculation and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life,” (Foucault 1978, 143). Precision bombing, as part of the liberal way of war, may be said to operate as part of the network of biopower through surveillance and precision targeting on behalf of war ostensibly fought for humanitarian reasons. Along with discipline, biopower constitutes one of the “two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed” (the other being discipline) (Foucault 1978, 139). Biopower concerns the supervision and intervention regarding the biological processes of birth, mortality, health, and life expectancy. Liberal, high-tech wars embody biopolitical warfare, through which the logic and practice of precision bombing are emblematic. The very nature of precision bombing is of calculated risk, of circular error probabilities, that the bomb will hit its target. Throughout the twentieth century, different technologies have allowed the CEP to decrease. Death is rendered calculable—that is, the destruction of the target. Death for civilians is also understood in this framework of risk and probability. As one proponent writes, “[Precision munitions] should be our weapon of choice because it is the most discriminate, prudent and risk-free weapon in our arsenal,” (Melinger 2001).

#### This culiminates in the bureaucratization of mass murder by which life is reduced to a database of targets.

Shaw 2013 [Ian G. R., research fellow in the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences at the University of

Glasgow, “Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of U.S. Drone Warfare,” Geopolitics, <http://www.academia.edu/2125232/Predator_Empire_The_Geopolitics_of_U.S._Drone_Warfare>]

Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of U.S. Drone Warfare

Since 2010, Obama administration officials have busily constructed a database for administering life and death. The “disposition matrix”1 as it’s called, contains a list of suspects targeted for elimination across the planet. These spreadsheets are now a permanent feature of U.S. national security. Once upon a time, targeted killings were antithetical to the American way of war. During the Clinton cabinet, officials debated fiercely about the legality of eliminating Osama bin Laden. Even by July 2001, the U.S. ambassador to Israel said “The United States government is very clearly on record as against targeted assassinations … They are extrajudicial killings and we do not support that”2. Now, targeted killings have become so normalized that the Obama administration is seeking ways to streamline the process. The disposition matrix was developed by Michael Leiter of the National Counterterrorism Center to centralize the kill lists across multiple state agencies, including the CIA and the Pentagon. The result is a single, evolving database in which “biographies, locations, known associates, and affiliated organizations are all catalogued. So are strategies for taking targets down, including extradition requests, capture operations and drone patrols”3. This deadly form of bureaucracy4 suggests the changing method of state violence: the decentralization of targeted killings across the globe and the simultaneous centralization of state power in the executive branch of government. From soldier, to special op, to lethal bureaucrat, this complicated and evolving geopolitical picture, one underwritten by lawfare, drones, and Orwellian terminology, is very much the new face of an old Empire.

#### **And the drone war’s expansion from culprits of 9/11 to low level henchwomen and affiliates is the tipping point for the codification and securitization of life itself in preemptive biopolitics**

Shaw 2013 [Ian G. R., research fellow in the School of Geographical and Earth Sciences at the University of

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Dillon and Reid extend Foucault’s biopolitics of the population to a biopolitics of the molecular. They argue that as the life sciences changed over the last century, so too did the “ bios ” of biopolitics, becoming ever more processual, spontaneous, and based on codes (such as DNA). This “ recombinant biopolitics ” fed directly into the visions of Rumsfeld’s “ Revolution in Military Affairs ” to create a new organizing principle “ concerned with surveillance and the accumulation and analysis of data concerning behaviour, the patterns which behaviour displays and the proﬁling of individuals within the population” 89 . Under this new metaphysics of power, in which “ power/knowledge is very much more concerned to establish proﬁles, patterns and probabilities” 90, information is a weapon and securing territory is no longer viewed with the same importance as securing patterns of life. For Foucault, this means that dangerousness, what is to be secured, is no longer an actualized danger, but is located within behavioral potentialities. Or as Bruce Braun suggests, “Today, security’s principal answer to the problem of ‘unknown unknowns’ is the speculative act of pre-emption , which takes as its target potential rather than actual risks ” 91 . Consequently, dangerous signatures or patterns of life are assessed on their very potential to become dangerous.In the tribal areas of Pakistan, for example, most people killed by U.S. drones have not been al- Qa’ida fighters. In fact, the number of al- Qa’ida militants eliminated has been just 8% under the Obama administration 92 . This means that a far greater number of people who played no part in the attacks of September 11, 2001 have been vaporized by Hellfire missiles. Former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,Christof Heyns, went so far as to question whether “ killings carried out in 2012 can be justified as in response to [events] in 2001 ” 93 . The presumptive “ guilt ” of many of those killed in Pakistan today is thus constructed around the so-called “ immanent ” threat they pose to the U.S. Homeland: a pre-emptive, future-oriented biopolitics that exists in an exceptional space outside of centuries of international humanitarian law. These Pakistani “ affiliates ”— which include the Pakistan Taliban and Haqqani Network members, are part of a much wider expansion of who count as affiliates in a globalizing drone war. The very condition that makes a biopolitics possible in the first place then — life — has become a force to be coded and secured. As Dillon describes it, “ The biopolitics of security today is precisely this political emergency of emergence instituting a regime of exception grounded in the endless calibration of the inﬁnite number of ways in which the very circulation of life threatens life rather than some existential friend/enemy distinction ” 94 .The appearance of the affiliate in the NSS and NSC marks the emergence of a far more process-based, even epidemiological understanding of danger, where the “ threat ” is located in what individuals could become in the future, and security is defined as anticipating and eliminating the emergence of such danger. For Dillon, this erasure of the concept of “ man ” by targeting “ life ” means that “ it is no longer adequate to judge lifelike bodies in terms of the essence of that existential otherness definite of the enemy alone, for every-body is a continuously emergent body-in-formation comprised of contingently adaptive rather than fixed properties ” 95 .The “ evental ” 96 nature of this “ emergent emergency ” helps explains the conditions surrounding the CIA’s shift in targeting practices from personality strikes to signature strikes and the changing object of national security from al- Qa’ida the organization to al-Qa’ida affiliates. In both cases the targets for the Predator Empire are not simply actualized forms of danger, but virtualized forms of emergence that may become threats in the future 97

#### Makes the whole planet killable – is a unique logic that renders the whole world as a target within the sovereign subject’s crosshairs.

**Shaw and Akhter, 2012** (Ian Graham Ronald, School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, The University of Glasgow and Majed, School of Geography and Development, University of Arizona, “The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan” Antipode, 1494-6)

In this section, we argue that the ramping up of drone deployments is justified by a distinctive targeting logic. As Paul Virrilo (1989) has long argued, there is never war without representation, which is to say, the deadly materiality of war is always coiled within a discursive system (see also Shaw 2010). In this sense, the drone performs a well-rehearsed imaginative geography (Bialasiewicz et al 2007; Gregory 2004) that is underwritten by targeted kills across neat isometric grids and algorithmic calculations (Amoore 2009), far removed from the brutal Real (Jones and Clarke 2006), and in a peculiar relation with the visceral imagery of previous wars (Tuathail 2003). The official “definition” of a targeted kill is not agreed upon under international law. Yet as a recent UN report on targeted killing reveals, it can be thought of as follows:

A targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator. In recent years, a few States have adopted policies, either openly or implicitly, of using targeted killings, including in the territories of other States. Such policies have been justified both as a legitimate response to “terrorist” threats and as a necessary response to the challenges of “asymmetric warfare”. In the legitimate struggle against terrorism, too many criminal acts have been re-characterized so as to justify addressing them within the framework of the law of armed conflict. New technologies, and especially unarmed combat aerial vehicles or “drones”, have been added into this mix, by making it easier to kill targets, with fewer risks to the targeting State (Alston 2010:3). The means and methods of killing vary, and include sniper fire, shooting at close range, missiles from helicopters, gunships, drones, the use of car bombs, and poison (Alston 2010:4)

The drone is heralded by the US military as the apex of a targeting logic— accurate, efficient, and deadly. This logic traces a distinct genesis. In 1938 Martin Heidegger wrote of the “age of the world picture”, in a classic essay on the split between subject and object. For him, today’s world is conceived, grasped, and conquered as a picture—and what it means “to be” is for the first time defined as the objectiveness of representing. In this modern age of humanism, a subjective “worldview” arises for the first time—humans appear as Cartesian subjects and the world as a calculated picture, engineered by science and technology. Ray Chow (2006) extends this metaphysical analysis to contend that the world has further been produced as a “target”. In the wake of the atomic event of Hiroshima, the entire globe is rendered as a grid of targets to be destroyed as soon as it can be made visible. Indeed, to see is to destroy.

Vision is thus crucial to an ocularcentric Western society (Rose 2001), and always already entangled within military culture. The ability to gaze from “nowhere” and yet represent “everywhere” is what Haraway (1988) labels the “god-trick”. She argues that the eyes have been perfected by the logics of military, capitalist, and colonial supremacy; one that is fundamentally located within a nexus of disembodiment: . . . the vantage point of the cyclopian, self-satiated eye of the master subject. The Western eye has fundamentally been a wandering eye. Vision is apparently without limit, the ‘ordinary primate’ can now see underwater, at night, through walls, into biological cells, onto distant galaxies: an “unregulated gluttony” that prides itself on its “objectivity” (1988:586).

This disembodied visual logic is perfected in the doctrine of airpower, the dominant theme of US national defense post World War II. Kaplan (2006a) names this a “cosmic view” that both unifies and separates “targets” from above. The sky is the space in which technology masters the world. It is clean, disembodied, and a place where nobody dies (that just happens on the ground). Do we not see here a colonial logic of “us” in the sky, versus “them” on the ground (Amoore 2009; Gregory 2010)? The drone is capable of performing (Bialasiewicz et al 2007) this logic, through a digital worldview of targets that dismisses ambiguity and reinforces the same old god-trick of a view of somewhere from nowhere (Kaplan 2006b). This is not to say that the sky is a space of pure deterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Since the mid-twentieth century the atmosphere has become increasingly nationalized, particularly after the Cold War (Kaplan 2006b; Williams 2010). The “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) was a set of tactics put forward by the USmilitary for securing the future of warfare (Kaplan 2009). They include information communications, space technology, satellites, drones, nano-robotics, all pivoting around the idea of “network-centric warfare”. As McDonald (2007) argues, this is precisely the reason that “outer space” needs to be investigated by critical geography, given that social life tied to the celestial, and space-based subjectivities are increasingly normalized.

Orbital logics thus spill into the everyday, as does the pervasive influence of targeting in US culture. From the use of GIS sciences that spatialize, calculate, and fix Cartesian wanderings—without a necessary appeal to the uniqueness of place or its crumpled ontologies—to the vicarious gazing and gaming of a far-away war (Shaw 2010; Wark 2007), targeting is now woven into the fabric of mundane life. GIS and GPS programs are no longer alien technologies used by armies and government agencies, but shared everyday practices. As such, the drone is not an aberration—but the apex of an expanding targeting zeitgeist. In this age, “to be” is to be locked within the cool certainty of a crosshair.

#### And the moral framework that justifies drones is the logic of the sovereign subject calculating which ones kill and which ones to save. This technologization makes all life calculable and therefore devaluable - guarantees the zeropoint.

**Dillon 99** (Michael, Professor of Politics and International Relations – University of Lancaster, “Another Justice”, Political Theory, 27(2), April, p. 164-165)

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.” But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. Tha**t** duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

#### **Plus militarism is just generally bad news bear – root cause of global militarization**

Hossezin-Zadeh 10 [Ismael teaches economics @ Drake University, “The Biggest Parasite,” 12-17-10, http://www.counterpunch.org/2010/12/17/the-globalization-of-militarism/ DOA: 7-31-13]

Many Americans still believe that US foreign policies are designed to maintain peace, to safeguard human rights and to spread democracy around the world. Regardless of their officially stated objectives, however, those policies often lead to opposite outcomes: war, militarism and dictatorship. Evidence of the fact that US policy makers no longer uphold the ideals they state publicly is overwhelming. Those who continue to harbor illusions about the thrust of US policies around the world must be oblivious to the fact that the United States has been overtaken by a military-industrial-security-financial cabal whose representatives are firmly ensconced in both the White House and the US Congress. The ultimate goal of the cabal, according to their own military guidelines, is “full spectrum dominance” of the world; and they are willing to wage as many wars, to destroy as many countries and to kill as many people as necessary to achieve that goal. The liberal hawks and petty intellectual pundits who tend to defend US foreign policies on the grounds of “human rights” or “moral obligations” are well served to pay attention (among other evidence) to the US foreign policy documents that are currently being disclosed by the Wikileaks. The documents “show all too clearly that,” as Paul Craig Roberts puts it, “the US government is a duplicitous entity whose raison d’etre is to control every other country.” In essence, the documents show that while the US government, like a global mafia godfather, rewards the pliant ruling elites of the client states with arms, financial aid and military protections, it punishes the nations whose leaders refuse to surrender to the wishes of the bully and relinquish their national sovereignty. US foreign policies, like its domestic policies, are revealed as catering not to the broader public or national interests of the people but to the powerful special interests that are vested primarily in the military capital and the finance capital. US foreign policy architects are clearly incapable of recognizing or acknowledging the fact that different peoples and nations may have different needs and interests. Nor are they capable of respecting other peoples’ aspirations to national sovereignty. Instead, they tend to view other peoples, just as they do the American people, through the narrow prism of their own nefarious interests. By selfishly dividing the world into “friends” and “foe,” or “vassal states,” as Zbigniew Brzezinski put it, powerful beneficiaries of war and militarism compel both groups to embark on a path of militarization, which leads inevitably to militarism and authoritarian rule. Although militarism grows out of the military, the two are different in character. While the military is a means to meet certain ends such as maintaining national security, militarism represents a bureaucratized permanent military establishment as an end in itself. It is “a phenomenon,” as the late Chalmers Johnson put it, “by which a nation’s armed services come to put their institutional preservation ahead of achieving national security or even a commitment to the integrity of the governmental structure of which they are a part” (The Sorrows of Empire, Metropolitan Books, 2004, pp. 423-24). This explains the cancerous growth and parasitic nature of US militarism cancerous because it is steadily expanding throughout many parts of the world, and parasitic because not only does it drain other nations resources, it also sucks US national resources out of the public purse into the coffers of the wicked interests that are vested in the military-industrial-security complex. By creating fear and instability and embarking on unilateral military adventures, corporate militarism of the United States also fosters militarism elsewhere. A major US strategy of expanding its imperial influence and promoting militarism around the globe has been the formation of international military alliances in various parts of the world. These include not only the notorious North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is essentially an integral part of the Pentagon’s world command structure, and which was recently expanded to police the world, but also 10 other joint military commands called Unified Combatant Commands. They include Africa Command (AFRICOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The geographic area under the “protection” of each of these Unified Combatant Commands is called Area of Responsibility (AOR). AFRICOM’s area of responsibility includes US “military operations and military relations with 53 African nations – an area of responsibility covering all of Africa except Egypt.” CENTCOM’s area of responsibility spans many countries in the Middle East/Near East/Persian Gulf and Central Asia. It includes Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. EUCOM’s area of responsibility “covers 51 countries and territories, including Europe, Iceland, Greenland, and Israel.” NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility “includes air, land and sea approaches and encompasses the contiguous United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles (930 km). It also includes the Gulf of Mexico, the Straits of Florida, portions of the Caribbean region to include The Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands.” PACOM’s area of responsibility “covers over fifty percent of the world’s surface area ? approximately 105 million square miles (nearly 272 million square kilometers) ? nearly sixty percent of the world’s population, thirty-six countries, twenty territories, and ten territories and possessions of the United States.” SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility “encompasses 32 nations (19 in Central and South America and 13 in the Caribbean)?and 14 US and European territories. . . . It is responsible for providing contingency planning and operations in Central and South America, the Caribbean (except US commonwealths, territories, and possessions), Cuba, their territorial waters.” Together with over 800 military bases scattered over many parts of the world, this military colossus represents an ominous presence of the US armed forces all across our planet. Instead of dismantling NATO as redundant in the post-Cold War era, it has been expanded (as a proxy for the US military juggernaut) to include many new countries in Eastern Europe all the way to the borders of Russia. Not only has it inserted itself into a number of new international relations and recruited many new members and partners, it has also arrogated to itself many new tasks and responsibilities in social, political, economic, environmental, transportation and communications arenas of the world. NATO’s new areas of “responsibility,” as reflected in its latest Strategic Concept, include “human rights”; “key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs. . .”; “important means of communication, such as the internet, and scientific and technological research. . .”; “proliferation of ballistic missiles, of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction”; “threat of extremism, terrorism and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people”; “vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend”; the “ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks”; and the need to “ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies.” Significant global issues thus claimed to be part of NATO’s expanded mission fall logically within the purview of civilian international institutions such as the United Nations. So why is the US ruling plutocracy, using NATO, now trying to supplant the United Nations and other international agencies? The reason is that due to the rise of the influence of a number of new international players such as Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, Iran, and Venezuela the UN is no longer as subservient to the global ambitions of the United States as it once was. Planning to employ the imperial military machine of NATO instead of the civilian multilateral institutions such as the UN clearly belies, once again, the self-righteous US claims of trying to spread democracy worldwide. Furthermore, NATO’s expanded “global responsibilities” would easily provide the imperial US military machine new excuses for unilateral military interventions. By the same token, such military adventures would also provide the US military-industrial-security complex additional rationale for continued escalation of the Pentagon budget. The expansion of NATO to include most of the Eastern Europe has led Russia, which had curtailed its military spending during the 1990s in the hope that, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the US would also do the same, to once again increase its military spending. In response to the escalation of US military spending, which has nearly tripled during the last 10 years (from $295 billion when George W. Bush went to the White House in January 2001 to the current figure of nearly one trillion dollars), Russia too has drastically increased its military spending during the same time period (from about $22 billion in 2000 to $61 billion today). In a similar fashion, US military encirclement of China (through a number of military alliances and partnerships that range from Pakistan, Afghanistan and India to South China Sea/Southeast Asia, Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Cambodia, Malaysia, New Zealand and most recently Vietnam) has led that country to also further strengthen its military capabilities. Just as the US military and geopolitical ambitions have led Russia and China to reinforce their military capabilities, so have they compelled other countries such as Iran, Venezuela and North Korea to likewise strengthen their armed forces and buttress their military preparedness. Not only does aggressive US militarism compel its “adversaries” to allocate a disproportionately large share of their precious resources to military spending, but it also coerces its “allies” to likewise embark on a path of militarization. Thus, countries like Japan and Germany, whose military capabilities were reduced to purely defensive postures following the atrocities of World War II, have once again been re-militarizing in recent years under the impetus of what US military strategists call “the need to share the burden of global security.” Thus, while Germany and Japan still operate under a “peace constitution,” their military expenditures on a global scale now rank sixth and seventh, respectively (behind the US, China, France, UK and Russia). US militarization of the world (both directly through the spread of its own military apparatus across the globe and indirectly by compelling both “friends” and “foe” to militarize) has a number of ominous consequences for the overwhelming majority or the population the world. For one thing, it is the source of a largely redundant and disproportionately large allocation of the world’s precious resources to war, militarism and wasteful production of the means of death and destruction. Obviously, as this inefficient, class-biased disbursement of resources drains public finance and accumulates national debt, it also brings tremendous riches and treasures to war profiteers, that is, the beneficiaries of the military capital and the finance capital. Secondly, to justify this lopsided allocation of the lion’s share of national resources to military spending, beneficiaries of war dividends tend to create fear, suspicion and hostility among peoples and nations of the world, thereby sowing the seeds of war, international conflicts and global instability. Thirdly, by the same token that powerful beneficiaries of war and military-security capital tend to promote suspicion, to create fear and invent enemies, both at home and abroad, they also undermine democratic values and nurture authoritarian rule. As the predatory military-industrial-security-financial interests find democratic norms of openness and transparency detrimental to their nefarious objectives of limitless self-enrichment, they cleverly create pretexts for secrecy, “security,” military rule and police state. Concealment of the robbery of public treasury in the name of national security requires restriction of information, obstruction of transparency, and curtailment of democracy. It follows that under the kleptocratic influence of the powerful interests that are vested in the military-security-financial industries the US government has turned into an ominous global force of destabilization, obstruction, retrogression and authoritarianism.

#### Thus the plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase statutory and or judicial restrictions on the war powers authority of the President of the United States to conduct targeted killing.

#### Contention 3: Solvency

#### The affirmative openly debates what constitutes a target – this closes the legal space that allows for unchecked violence.

**Shaw and Akhter, 2012** (Ian Graham Ronald, School of Geographical and Earth Sciences, The University of Glasgow and Majed, School of Geography and Development, University of Arizona, “The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan” Antipode, 1504-05

The legal space that drones operate in is thus located in the deadly residue of drone and document. The ongoing silence of the CIA with respect to its drone operations in Pakistan is raising international and national criticism. Recent Congressional hearings in the USA have debated this, with much of the discussion centered on what counts as a legitimate “target” for assassination and “self-defense”. Indeed, the CIA’s drone strikes are controversial precisely because they exist in a shadowy vacuum of accountability. As the UN Special Rapporteur (on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions) Phillip Alston puts it, “Transparency is required by both [international humanitarian law] and human rights law. A lack of disclosure gives States a virtual and impermissible license to kill” (Alston 2010). This led a prominent law professor to suggest that drone pilots could be liable for war crimes (Hodge 2010). Currently, US drone attacks are justified following 9/11, an event that led Congress to grant the President the ability to use all necessary force against persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the attacks of 9/11 (“The authorization for use of military force against terrorists”, Public Law 107–40). In addition to domestic law, the USA relies on international law in the guise of Article 51 of the UN Charter: A targeted killing conducted by one State in the territory of a second State does not violate the second State’s sovereignty if either (a) the second State consents, or (b) the first, targeting, State has a right under international law to use force in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, because (i) the second State is responsible for an armed attack against the first State, or (ii) the second State is unwilling or unable to stop armed attacks against the first State launched from its territory. International law permits the use of lethal force in self-defence in response to an “armed attack” as long as that force is necessary and proportionate (Alston 2010:12).

Both the CIA and Pakistani government remain tight-lipped on the drone program, allowing it to persist in deadly ~~silence~~ unnoticed and continually undo FATA’s sovereignty. This is opposed to Alston’s (2010:27) recommendation that “If a State commits a targeted killing in the territory of another State, the second State should publicly indicate whether it gave consent, and on what basis”. US State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh has defended the drone program, arguing the attacks against suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban targets are bundled into the nation’s legitimate right to self-defense: “Koh also asserted that in targeting suspected militants via drone strikes the United States was adhering to basic international humanitarian law rules regarding distinction and proportionality. These rules, meant to protect civilians from harm, do not protect civilians absolutely” (Mariner 2010). The status of “civilian” is therefore worryingly undermined by the drone. As one professor and legal scholar at George Washington University, puts it:

. . . instead of apologizing each time the wrong individual is targeted or collateral damage is caused, we should stress that the issue would be largely resolved in short order if the abusive civilians would stop their abusive practices and fight—if they must—according to established rules of war. They cannot have it both ways . . . (Etzioni 2010:67: emphasis in original).

There is therefore much at stake in drone warfare, including the status of those civilians under the constant watch of the Predator; human beings that are so often translated into statistical and targeted calculations. In this sense, our argument is that the US-led attacks in FATA result from the interactions between the drone itself and the legal history of Pakistan’s northwest, enshrined in FCR of 1901. Both of these objects act in concert to produce an exceptional and contingent space. In this sense, territory is itself a shifting outcome of wider political processes. Never does it sit there, and never does it sit still.

#### **This debate defends separation of powers and thereby advances democratic struggle by restraining executive authority and agitating for a better world. Solves the state of exception**

Lauritsen 2010 [Holger Ross Aarhus University “Democracy and the Separation of Powers: A Rancièrean Approach,” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory, found via ebscohost, 18]

Rancière clearly rejects the liberal claim that liberal democratic institutions, for instance the separation of powers, constitute the essence of democracy. ‘Democracy […] is not a set of institutions […] Democracy is not the parliamentary system or the rule of law’ (Rancière, 1998: 99).5 In opposition to Agamben, however, this does not imply a rejection of liberal democratic institutions and rights as such. These institutions and rights should certainly be defended, and his paradoxical claim is that this defence is not taken care of by the political liberalism that prevails in political discourse today. Thus, ‘the victory of so-called formal democracy is accompanied by a noticeable disaffection with regard to its forms’ (Rancière, 1998: 97). These forms, on the other hand, have often been defended ‘most strenuously’ by those who ‘have often been the ﬁrst to suspect that these rights were only theoretical, still a mere shadow of true democracy’ (Rancière, 1998: 96). To put it in more general terms, the idea of an opposition between real democracy and formal liberal democracy has served as a defence of the latter. To be sure, this opposition can also have a metapolitical signiﬁcance, and formal democracy can be seen as an illusion the function of which is but to hide the absence of real democracy. Often, however, formal democracy has been seen as a part realization of real democracy, and, in such cases, the defence of formal democracy becomes highly ardent. In fact, when formal democracy is considered nothing but a promise of a real democracy to come, restrictions of the former are simply intolerable. Inversely, the belief that this promise has already been fulﬁlled easily becomes politically pacifying.

The democratic struggle, it should ﬁnally be pointed out, could be deﬁned as the practice of creating what Rancière calls a disagreement (Rancière, 1998: x–ii), that is, a discord concerning the interpretation of liberal democratic institutions and rights, for instance the principle of separation of powers. Thus, when, in a state of exception, the executive claims to observe this principle, the democratic political practice would consist in pointing out that this is not the case, that the executive is in fact misusing the principle. That is to say, this practice does not, as the metapoliticians, see this misuse of the principle of separation of powers as the truth of the principle, thus denouncing the principle as such. Neither is this practice, as the liberals, content with a formal observation of the principle. In opposition to these two conceptions of liberal democracy, democratic struggle is a practice which uses the principle of separation of powers, and in general all liberal democratic institutions and rights, as a tool for contesting, by promoting democratic progress, the current exercise of power

#### And this spills over to a public conversation rethinking what it means for us to be political wartime subjects and allowing for a broader outpouring of open grief and outrage at injustice disrupting political order.

**Butler, 2009** (Judith, original genius, “Frames of War,” Verso, 39-40)

So, one way of posing the question of who "we" are in these times of war is by asking whose lives are considered valuable, whose lives are mourned, and whose lives are considered ungrievable. We might think of war as dividing populations into those who are grievable and those who are not. An ungrievable life is one that cannot be mourned because it has never lived, that is, it has never counted as a life at all. We can see the division of the globe into grievable and ungrievable lives from the perspective of those who wage war in order to defend the lives of certain communities, and to defend them against the lives of others-even if it means taking those latter lives. After the attacks of 9/11, we encountered in the media graphic pictures of those who died, along with their names, their stories, the reactions of their families. Public grieving was dedicated to making these images iconic for the nation, which meant of course that there was considerably less public grieving for non-US nationals, and none at all for illegal workers.

The differential distribution of public grieving is a political issue of enormous significance. It has been since at least the time of Antigone, when she chose openly to mourn the death of one of her brothers even though it went against the sovereign law to do so. Why is it that governments so often seek to regulate and control who will be publicly grievable and who will not? In the initial years of the AIDS crisis in the US, the public vigils, and the Names Project broke through the public shame associated with dying from AIDS, a shame associated sometimes with homosexuality, and especially anal sex, and sometimes with drugs and promiscuity. It meant something to state and show the name, to put together some remnants of a life, to publicly display and avow the loss. What would happen if those killed in the current wars were to be grieved in just such an open way? Why is it that we are not given the names of all the war dead, including those the US has killed, of whom we will never have the image, the name, the story, never a testimonial shard of their life, something to see, to touch, to know? Although it is not possible to singularize every life destroyed in war, there are surely ways to register the populations injured and destroyed without fully assimilating to the iconic function of the image. 4

Open grieving is bound up with outrage, and outrage in the face of injustice or indeed of unbearable loss has enormous political potential. It is, after all, one of the reasons Plato wanted to ban the poets from the Republic. He thought that if the citizens went too often to watch tragedy, they would weep over the losses they saw, and that such open and public mourning, in disrupting the order and hierarchy of the soul, would disrupt the order and hierarchy of political authority as well. Whether we are speaking about open grief or outrage, we are talking about affective responses that are highly regulated by regimes of power and sometimes subject to explicit censorship. In the contemporary wars in which the US is directly engaged, those in Iraq and Afghanistan, we can see how affect is regulated to support both the war effort and, more specifically, nationalist belonging. When the photos of Abu Ghraib were first released in the US, conservative television pundits argued that it would be unAmerican to show them. We were not supposed to have graphic evidence of the acts of torture US personnel had committed. We were not supposed to know that the US had violated internationally recognized human rights. It was un-American to show these photos and un-American to glean information from them as to how the war was being conducted. The conservative political commentator Bill O'Reilly thought that the photos would create a negative image of the US and that we had an obligation to defend a positive image.5 Donald Rumsfeld said something similar, suggesting that it was anti-American to display the photos.6 Of course, neither considered that the American public might have a right to know about the activities of its military, or that the public's right to judge the war on the basis of full evidence is part of the democratic tradition of participation and deliberation. So what was really being said? It seems to me that those who sought to limit the power of the image in this instance also sought to limit the power of affect, of outrage, knowing full well that it could and would turn public opinion against the war in Iraq, as indeed it did.

#### And this debate about war in the absence of declared conflict allows us to shift outside of conceptions of war as an event and allow us to conceptualize it as a larger presence. Solves root cause of militarism

**Cuomo 2003** [Chris, professor of Philosophy and Women Studies at UGA “The Philosopher Queen: Feminist Essays on War, Love and Knowledge,” 18-19]

Military decisions are not the clean moral problems described by philosophers of war, such as Grotius, Augustine, and Aquinas, or by contemporary proponents of “just war” theories. Just war theorists take war to be isolated definable events with clear boundaries that distinguish the circumstances in which standard moral rules and constraints such as rules against murder and unprovoked violence, no longer apply. Just war principles are applied in proper decision-making by agents of the state before wars occur, or in looking back and evaluating war and military actions once they are over. They therefore assume that military initiatives are distinct events. But in fact declarations of war are usually overdetermined escalations of preexisting conditions. Just war criteria do not encourage evaluations of military and related institutions, including peacetime practices and how they related to wartime activities. They cannot adequately address the ways armed conflicts between and among states emerge from omnipresent and violent state militarism, or in the remarkable resemblance between states of peace and states of war.

Spatial metaphors (in war, out of war, at war) represent war as a separate bounded sphere, and indicate the assumption that war is a realm of human activity vastly removed from normal life—a sort of happening that is appropriately conceived apart from everyday events in peaceful times. At the same time, war is also taken to be a necessary state that is inherent in human nature that inevitably erupts and reconfigures reality. When war is seen as a necessary event, peacetime military practices enjoy immunity to moral reproach, because they too are considered necessary. Whether or not it is inevitable, war is not just an event, because it is a presence, a constant white noise in the background of social existence. It sometimes moves closer to the foreground of collective consciousness in the form of declared wars and documented violence, but it is always present in the form of everyday military violence. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflict is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for some of us to maintain this false belief, because privilege or luck or ignorance allows us to keep our distance from war.

Seeing war as an event is like seeing rape or school shootings or suicide bombings as isolated events rather than as occurrences that arise from specific social systems and values. When we take those things to be isolated events , we focus on evil men, insanity, and our own sense of powerlessness and pathos. Focusing on catastrophic events, movements against war or other forms of brutal violence are exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is mobilized when the “real” violence occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and when it seems necessary to drop all other political priorities. When the war is over, there is simply no longer a need for a movement (and we find that preexisting movements against violence and injustice have abated because everyone has been so distracted by the crisis of war).

But horribly damaging state-sponsored violence occurs regularly and widely, and much of it is perpetuated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state. Those institutions and agents are not just out there somewhere.

#### And it allows for a broader reconceptualization of moral obligation. This breaks through the predetermination of traditional calculation and allows us to grapple with both the unknowability of the future and infinite responsibility we face in making moral decisions. Only doing so allows us to become moral subjects.

**Dillon 99** (Michael, Professor of Politics and International Relations – University of Lancaster, “Another Justice”, Political Theory, 27(2), April, p. 166-167)

The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision. In the realm of undecidability, decision is precisely not the mechanical application of a rule or norm. Nor is it surrender to the necessity of contin- gency and circumstance. Neither is it something taken blindly, without reflection and the mobilisation of what can be known. On the contrary, knowing is necessary and, indeed, integral to 'decision'. But it does not exhaust 'decision', and cannot do so if there is to be said to be such a thing as a 'decision'. We do not need deconstruction, of course, to tell us this. The management science of decision has long since known something like it through the early reflections of, for example, Herbert Simon and Geoffrey Vickers.38 But only deconstruction gives us it to think, and only deconstructively sensible philosophy thinks it through. To think decision through is to think it as heterogeneous to the field of knowing and possible knowing within which it is always located.39 And only deconstruction thinks it through to the intimate relation between 'decision' and the assumption of responsibility, which effect egress into a future that has not yet been-could not as yet have been-known: The instant of decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the per- son taking the decision not know everything.40 Ultimately one cannot know everything because one is advancing into a future which simply cannot be anticipated, and into which one cannot see. This is no simple absence of knowing. Neither is it an economic account of the asymmetry of knowing. Nor, finally, is it a matter of calculating the logics that apply in situations of imperfect information. Here we have no mere lack of knowledge that may be remedied, calibrated, or otherwise represented mathematically and of which an account can be taken. What I am referring to is, instead, a lack integral to the structure of any and every 'decision'; where the issue precisely is not a matter of not yet knowing but of the unknowable inalienable from knowing itself. Further even, and this is the crux of the issue, it is a matter of that peculiar infinite responsibility which releases the human pneuma in respect of unknowability as such. A peculiar and quite distinctive form of responsibility thereby arises; it corresponds to the very unknowability that invokes it. Since the unknowable is not the not yet known, but that which cannot be known in every act or exercise of knowing, it is attended by a responsibility which can similarly never be discharged. Assumption of responsibility for this unknowability-taking it on-is what makes a 'dec- ision' a 'decision'; rather than the application of judgment according to a rule, or the submission to the necessity of a law, however that law is decreed or described. Short of divesting the human of that very lack of measure, the assumption of which distinguishes the being of human being, this responsi- bility will never be discharged. Here then, too, the thinking of deconstruction reveals its profoundly ethical and political character: through its commitment to think and not elide the aporetic character of the co-presence of the ethical and the political; through its insistence on the inescapability of assuming responsibility for that immeasurable task; and through its continuous indict- ment of the hubristic eclipsing of undecidability by decidedness. For decon- struction is ultimately not an analytical technique. Rather, it is the event of undecidability, simply the case as Derrida puts it, taking place in every decid- edness. Thus 'decision' is that which is prepared to own responsibility for undecidability. It knows that neither 'decision' nor responsibility will ever discharge each other in relation to this Otherness. Since undecidable is there- fore what 'we' are-or suffer-an ethos may arise governed by the desire continuously to make way for the immeasurable responsibility consequent upon it. Such an ethos, it may then be said-I would want to say-is what dis- tinguishes political life. Call this self plural, divided and hybrid, excessive and incomplete. Call it articulation, not an atom, expressed and joined by its difference from itself. Whatever is determined by this condition is no secure foundation for justice or even, ultimately, of rights. It is something more awesome, something from which these arise; the very occasion, in fact the only occasion we know, of the claim of another Justice. The human self is therefore continuously sum- moned the more so it responds to that insatiable injunction of which it is the expression. Such a divided self is the 'origin'-the taking place-of the call of another Justice of which its own being is the very event. Contrast how pro- foundly different such an account of 'origin' is from that, for example, of Rawls' "original position."4' Not a contract but the advent of the claim of another Justice is what distinguishes that event, precipitating also the way of its unfolding

#### **Finally our solvency need not be linear and final – the antagonism of the affirmative allows for dramatic social change because society is a complex system that is dependent on initial conditions.**

Ibañez and Iñiguez, 97 [Tomas and Lupiciano, Professor and lecturer of Social Psychology at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, “Critical Social Psychology,” 35-6]

The Selforganizational Nature of Social Reality

Self-organizational systems are basically characterized by their property of eluding the second law of thermodynamics by virtue of a series of internal mechanisms which, alone, generate neguentropic processes. These processes lead to internally self-generated increments of complexity. This means that we are dealing both with systems endowed with sufficient redundancy or internal variability, among other things, to transform the input provided by the environment into structuring processes and also with systems which maintain their structure and make it ever more complex through the very forces and energies which act against the maintenance of the system. Although this may appear paradoxical, self-organization is not possible if it is not carried out by means of the simultaneous presence of antagonistic forces and mutually incompatible elements. In other words, a system which does not produce errors in its function, which does not experience noise, and which cannot enrich itself precisely because of these errors and of the noise, is incapable of accomplishing internal neguentropic changes by itself. A system which does not produce errors, or cannot enrich itself by means of these errors, can only change towards greater complexity or a readaptation to the changeable characteristics of the environment through an agent exterior to the system, or by means of a programme of change incorporated therein from the very moment of its constitution. One of the most interesting characteristics of self-organizational systems is rooted in the unpredictability of the effective changes which the system undergoes. This unpredictability does not arise from insufficient knowledge of the processes experienced by these systems, from an insufficient mastering of their laws of functioning, nor from imprecision in relation to the definition of their initial states, but it is the result of their sensitivity to random influences and to evolution, which responds to non-linear equations with several solutions that are equally possible.

Bearing in mind the characteristics of self-organizational systems, it seems sufficiently clear that societies exhibit a series of properties which brand them as such systems. I will cite a few:

• Society is neither designed nor regulated by the art or magic of any exterior agent or will (clearly the figure of colonialism does not constitute a counter example).

Society is not implemented from its beginnings by a programme which incorporates the instructions for its functional evolution:

• Society maintains itself, by definition, in a state of non-equilibrium, that is, a state remote from maximum entropy.

• There is no society without social differentiation and social structures. Moreover, modern societies are characterized by a strong internal differentiation with a high degree of redundancy or structural and functional variability;

• Society evolves historically towards greater complexity, and this social evolution constitutes an irreversible process (except, obviously, if society is destroyed).

• As Popper argued, there are reasons of principle which make precise knowledge of the evolution of a society impossible.

## On case

### Case proper

#### Extend the Dillon evidence – moral calculation of human life turns life into currency within political economy – makes life devaluable – guarantees the zeropoint – this is an extinction level claim that outweighs theirs because it is also the necessary condition for nuclear war.

#### And the Cuomo evidence indicates that only attention to the conditions of militarism allow for us to deal with the root cause of conflict – anything else locks in continued warfare – means we control the conditions for the disads

#### And extend the Butler evidence – our public affirmation of the lives lost by drone strikes allows for a broader reconceptualization of the worth of human life. That disrupts biopolitical calculation and militarism making ethical decisions about human life possible – means you default aff on the risk we can solve Dillon because that moral framework is key to respect for life.

#### Costless war fantasy allows us to pretend that our retribution against the other is invulnerable and anonymous.

**Zolkos 2011** (Magdalena, Research Fellow in Political Theory with the School of Humanities and Communication Arts at University of Western Sidney, “Can There Be Costless War? Violent Exposures and (In)Vulnerable Selves in Benjamin Percy's 'Refresh, Refresh,'” Critical Horizons)

The fantasy of the “costless war” furnishes an imaginary of violence that is “sterile” in the sense of being uncontaminated by what otherwise constitutes the dimensional complexity of violence, namely its inter-subjective terrain. To put it in terms of the late-capitalist paradox, as articulated by Slavoj Zizek’s formula of “Other without Otherness”, at stake is an imaginary scene that represents wish fulfillment of violence without violence. The seductive appeal of the “costless war” fantasy rests therefore on the desire for the self that remains invulnerable and unaffected in the face of violence – tightly sealed from the suffering of the other. The subject acquires the capacity to bring about an act of harm or destruction on the other that remains ultimately, consequential for the self.

Some critics of the implications of the warfare robotic revolution for the democratic processes have looked at these developments from the perspective of the disjunction that between the public and the military, as well as between the defense and foreign policy. Notably, the creation of distance between the American subject and the act of military violence has not resulted in public indifference to or emotional disinvestment in, the American wars. One example to the contrary is the popularity of the video genre of the so-called “war porn”, which depicts real combat footage of the encounters between the troops and the insurgents; a trend that Pasquinelli has called the “morbid fetishization of war imagery. This suggests that emergent is perhaps a different kind of engagement with the spectacle of war, rather than disengagement. The subjective positions of a drone-operator, geographically removed from the attack target by thousands of miles, and of a spectator of a graphic video footage of violent military action share a common “grammar”. It is constituted by the technological construction of their respective positions, as well as by the larger framework of the politics of invulnerability – the phantasmatic, but no less real, workings of the state power that render the subject unaffected, or impermeable, by the act of violence against the other. The aim of the article is to explore what is at stake in such politics of invulnerability, or, in other words, what is the cost of the costless war.

#### Their data is highly flawed – selective and partial

**Boyle 2013** [Michael J., Assistant professor of political science at La Salle University, “The costs and consequences of drone warfare,” International Affairs 89: 1 (2013) 1–29]

Arguments for the effectiveness of drones can be subdivided into four separate claims: (1) that drones are effective at killing terrorists with minimal civilian casualties; (2) that drones have been successful at killing so-called ‘high value targets’ (HVTs); (3) that the use of drones puts such pressure on terrorist organizations that it degrades their organizational capacity and ability to strike; and (4) that a cost–benefit analysis of their use relative to other options—such as the deployment of ground troops—provides a compelling argument in their favour. None of these claims should be taken at face value. The evidence behind each is often less compelling than is assumed, in part because reliable data on the drone strikes and their effects are difficult to obtain. Some of these arguments are based on dubious counterfactuals that try to measure the costs of drone strikes against the effects of prevented, and entirely hypothetical, enemy attacks.17 Others conflate efficiency—that is, an advantageous ratio of inputs to outputs in executing an activity—with the effectiveness of a particular action in achieving a wider goal. Still others operate with an attenuated notion of effectiveness which focuses exclusively at the tactical level without considering the wider strategic costs of drone warfare. The position of the American foreign policy establishment on drones— that they are an effective tool which minimizes civilian casualties—is based on a highly selective and partial reading of the evidence.

### Util

#### **Our moral framework is ethical responsivity – that means that the debate comes down to who best responds to the needs of the other regardless of predicted consequences and conventional morality – that’s Dillon**

#### Means that our moral responsibility to the other comes before questions of possible extinction – anything else is immoral and

#### And can’t save everyone – but there is a morally significant difference between killing people and saving everyone. We are not obligated to save everyone but we are morally obligated not to kill people

**McLachlan 2008** [H.V. Centre for Ethics in Public Policy and Corporate Governance, School of Law and Social Sciences, Glasgow Caledonian University, “The Ethics of Killing and Letting Die: Active and Passive Euthanasia” Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 34, No. 8 (Aug., 2008), pp. 636-638, found via Jstor]

I would, however, deny that "omissions can clearly kill 77 although I would concede that omissions can indirectly lead to deaths insofar as they might fail to prevent them. More importantly, I would stress that actively to kill someone is significantly morally different from failing to do something that would have prevented the person from dying. Even when both are morally wrong and equally morally wrong they are different moral wrongs. The doctor's failure to prescribe antibiotics was wrong especially if it was malevolent, but it was a wrongful omission rather than a wrongful killing. To drown a child is illegal and murder. To fail to save a child is not (and should not be) to commit murder even if it sometimes is to be guilty of failing to fulfill a duty of care. There is a moral difference between drowning a child yourself and failing to save a drowning child. There is and should be a legal distinction. Sometimes, one could save one child from drowning only by neglecting some other drowning child. Contrariwise, it is not the case that one can avoid murdering one particular child only by murdering another one.

Suppose that you are walking by a lake in which 10 children are swimming happily. You have a legal and a moral duty towards each child not to drown him or her and each has a moral and legal right not to be drowned by you. None has a legal right against you to be saved from drowning. Suppose that, simultaneously, each of the children has a violent coughing fit and each one will drown unless he is rescued by a passer-by. If you are the only passer-by and you, somehow, realise the peril that each child is in then it might or might not be praiseworthy if you risked your own life by trying to save one of the children. If you are a non-swimmer and have children of your own at home and a sick wife to care for then the action might be foolhardy and blameworthy even if not criminal. Even if the action is praiseworthy it is clearly not legally obligatory. It is far from obvious that, even if you can swim, it is morally obligatory to try to save a child. Even if you are morally obliged to try to save a child, it is noteworthy that none of the children has a corresponding moral right against you that you try to save him. You cannot save them all. You cannot even reasonably try to save them all.

#### **No link to consequentialism – we are consequentialistic, but we ask what consequences come are important.** The negative’s failure to ask this question turns their impact framing – makes consequentialism too idealistic to deal with a militarized context that uses consequences and protection to justify drone strikes – that’s the hossezin and the Wilcox evidence – means their consequentialism leads to bad consequences which is a reason to vote aff

#### And calculation outweighs war

Burke 7 – Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony “What security makes possible,” Working Paper 2007 p.11-12)

**Even if threats are credible and existential**, I do not believe that they warrant invoking the ‘state of exception’, which has in our time been more commonly enacted in the detention and rendition of terrorism suspects, immigration detention centres and the use of arbitrary arrest and deportation powers. The ‘state of exception’ also haunts much legial innovation in counter-terrorism policy. And, as Agamben, Judith Butler and Arendt have argued, such approaches have their roots in processes (namely colonialism and the Holocaust) that **systematically dehumanized their victims producing lives that were ‘bare’, ‘ungreivable’, ‘unliveable’ and ‘superfluous’**. If nothing else, it ought to raise serious doubts as to how securitization theory can be helpful in resignifying security as emancipation. It also precludes the ability to speak of human or environmental security in terms consistent with democratic political processes in a state of normalacy. The existential threat of human beings may be real enough, but it should generate a **very different policy logic** than outlined by the Copenhagen School. As Rocanne Lynn Doty and Karin Fierke have argued, the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization blocks the path to human security. This would seem to be implicit in the way Waever, in his 1995 article, attempts to provide security with ontological grounding. There he states that ‘as concepts, neither individual nor international security exist’: National security, that is the security of a state, is the name of an ongoing debate, tradition, an established set of practices ... there is no literature, no philosophy, no tradition of security in non-state terms ... the concept of security refers to the state.36

#### And Dillon is another impact turn – that’s at the top of the case flow – consequentialism reduces life to numbers – causing the zeropoint - that’s an extinction level disad.

#### And their framing is rigged - requires us to support military violence - guarantees subsequent intervention – makes their impacts inevitable and subjects us to linguistic violence.

**Butler, 1997** (Judith, original genius, “Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative,” 18)

Morrison's analogy suggests that language lives or dies as a living thing might live or die, and that the question of survival is central to the question of how language is used. She claims that "oppressive language ... is violence;' not merely a representation of it. Oppressive language is not a substitute for the experience of violence. It enacts its Own kind of violence. Language remains alive when it refuses to "encapsulate" (20) or "capture" (21) the events and lives it describes. But when it seeks to effect that capture, language not only loses its vitality, but acquires its own violent force, one that Morrison throughout the lecture associates with statist language and censorship. She writes, "the vitality of language lies in its ability to limn the actual, imagined and possible lives of its speakers, readers, writers. Although its poise is sometimes in displacing experience, it is not a substitute for it. It arcs toward the place where meaning may lie:' (20) And later: "its force, its felicity, is in its reach toward the ineffable:' (21) The violence of language consists in its effort to capture the ineffable and, hence, to destroy it, to seize hold of that which must remain elusive for language to operate as a living thing.

The children's question is cruel not because it is certain that they have killed the bird, but because the use of language to force the choice from the blind woman is itself a seizing hold of language, One whose force is drawn from the conjured destruction of the bird. The hate speech that the children perform seeks to capture the blind woman in the moment of humiliation, but also to transfer the violence done to the bird to the Woman herself, a transfer that belongs to the particular temporality of the threat. In a sense, the threat begins the performance of that which it threatens to perform; but in not quite fully performing it, seeks to establish, through language, the certitude of that future in which it will be performed.

#### Finally – our moral framework subsumes theirs –a 200 year old philosophy and incomplete information can’t make our decisions– only our ability to make tough moral decisions by resisting militarism writ large allows contextual evaluation, moral responsibility and therefore morality – means there is only a risk we solve because any other framework is arbitrary - that’s the second Dillon evidence and the Cuomo evidence.

### Predictions

#### Extend Ibanez and Iniguez – society is non-linear because it’s a complex/chaotic system – makes precise predictions impossible – which means ethical decision making comes first – that’s Dillon

#### Mor ev - You cannot make linear predictions within the international system – it’s inherently volatile

Taleb & Blythe 11 – \*Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering at New York University’s Polytechnic Institute, AND \*\*Professor of International Political Economy at Brown University (Nassim and Mark, May/June 2011, “The Black Swan of Cairo How Suppressing Volatility Makes the World Less Predictable and More Dangerous,” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67741/nassim-nicholas-taleb-and-mark-blyth/the-black-swan-of-cairo>)

Why is surprise the permanent condition of the U.S. political and economic elite? In 2007–8, when the global ﬁnancial system imploded, the cry that no one could have seen this coming was heard everywhere, despite the existence of numerous analyses showing that a crisis was unavoidable. It is no surprise that one hears precisely the same response today regarding the current turmoil in the Middle East. The critical issue in both cases is the artiﬁcial suppres- sion of volatility—the ups and downs of life—in the name of stability. It is both mis- guided and dangerous to push unobserved risks further into the statistical tails of the probability distribution of outcomes and allow these high-impact, low-probability “tail risks” to disappear from policymakers’ ﬁelds of observation. What the world is witnessing in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is simply what happens when highly constrained systems explode. Complex systems that have artiﬁcially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting ﬂuctuations, the result tends to be the opposite. These artiﬁcially con- strained systems become prone to “Black Swans”—that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers. Such environments eventually experi- ence massive blowups, catching everyone oª-guard and undoing years of stability or, in some cases, ending up far worse than they were in their initial volatile state. Indeed, the longer it takes for the blowup to occur, the worse the resulting harm in both economic and political systems. Seeking to restrict variability seems to be good policy (who does not prefer stability to chaos?), so it is with very good intentions that policymakers unwittingly increase the risk of major blowups. And it is the same misperception of the properties of natural systems that led to both the economic crisis of 2007–8 and the current turmoil in the Arab world. The policy implications are identical: to make systems robust, all risks must be visible and out in the open— ﬂuctuat nec mergitur(it ﬂuctuates but does not sink) goes the Latin saying. Just as a robust economic system is one that encourages early failures (the concepts of “fail small” and “fail fast”), the U.S. gov- ernment should stop supporting dictato- rial regimes for the sake of pseudostability and instead allow political noise to rise to the surface. Making an economy robust in the face of business swings requires allowing risk to be visible; the same is true in politics. SEDUCED BY STABILITY Both the recent ﬁnancial crisis and the current political crisis in the Middle East are grounded in the rise of complexity, interdependence, and unpredictability. Policymakers in the United Kingdom and the United States have long promoted policies aimed at eliminating ﬂuctuation— no more booms and busts in the economy, no more “Iranian surprises” in foreign policy. These policies have almost always produced undesirable outcomes. For example, the U.S. banking system became very fragile following a succession of pro- gressively larger bailouts and government interventions, particularly after the 1983 rescue of major banks (ironically, by the same Reagan administration that trum- peted free markets). In the United States, promoting these bad policies has been a bipartisan eªort throughout. Republicans have been good at fragilizing large corpora- tions through bailouts, and Democrats have been good at fragilizing the government. At the same time, the ﬁnancial system as a whole exhibited little volatility; it kept get- ting weaker while providing policymakers with the illusion of stability, illustrated most notably when Ben Bernanke, who was then a member of the Board of Gover- nors of the U.S. Federal Reserve, declared the era of “the great moderation” in 2004. Putatively independent central bankers fell into the same trap. During the 1990s, U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan wanted to iron out the economic cycle’s booms and busts, and he sought to control economic swings with interest-rate reductions at the slightest sign of a downward tick in the economic data. Furthermore, he adapted his eco- nomic policy to guarantee bank rescues, with implicit promises of a backstop—the now infamous “Greenspan put.” These policies proved to have grave delayed side effects. Washington stabilized the market with bailouts and by allowing certain com- panies to grow “too big to fail.” Because policymakers believed it was better to do something than to do nothing, they felt obligated to heal the economy rather than wait and see if it healed on its own. The foreign policy equivalent is to support the incumbent no matter what. And just as banks took wild risks thanks to Greenspan’s implicit insurance policy, client governments such as Hosni Mubarak’s in Egypt for years engaged in overt plunder thanks to similarly reliable U.S. support. Those who seek to prevent volatility on the grounds that any and all bumps in the road must be avoided paradoxically increase the probability that a tail risk will cause a major explosion. Consider as a thought experiment a man placed in an artiﬁcially sterilized environment for a decade and then invited to take a ride on a crowded subway; he would be expected to die quickly. Likewise, preventing small forest ﬁres can cause larger forest ﬁres to become devastating. This property is shared by all complex systems. In the realm of economics, price con- trols are designed to constrain volatility on the grounds that stable prices are a good thing. But although these controls might work in some rare situations, the long-term effect of any such system is an eventual and extremely costly blowup whose cleanup costs can far exceed the beneﬁts accrued. The risks of a dictatorship, no matter how seemingly stable, are no diªerent, in the long run, from those of an artiﬁcially controlled price. Such attempts to institutionally engineer the world come in two types: those that conform to the world as it is and those that attempt to reform the world. The nature of humans, quite reasonably, is to in- tervene in an eªort to alter their world and the outcomes it produces. But government interventions are laden with unintended— and unforeseen—consequences, particularly in complex systems, so humans must work with nature by tolerating systems that absorb human imperfections rather than seek to change them. Take, for example, the recent celebrated documentary on the ﬁnancial crisis, Inside Job, which blames the crisis on the malfea- sance and dishonesty of bankers and the incompetence of regulators. Although it is morally satisfying, the ﬁlm naively over- looks the fact that humans have always been dishonest and regulators have always been behind the curve. The only diªerence this time around was the unprecedented magnitude of the hidden risks and a mis- understanding of the statistical properties of the system. What is needed is a system that can prevent the harm done to citizens by the dishonesty of business elites; the limited competence of forecasters, economists, and statisticians; and the imperfections of regulation, not one that aims to eliminate these ﬂaws. Humans must try to resist the illusion of control: just as foreign policy should be intelligence-proof (it should minimize its reliance on the competence of information-gathering organizations and the predictions of “experts” in what are inherently unpredictable domains), the economy should be regulator-proof, given that some regulations simply make the system itself more fragile. Due to the complexity of markets, intricate regulations simply serve to generate fees for lawyers and proﬁts for sophisticated derivatives traders who can build complicated ﬁnancial products that skirt those regulations. DON’T BE A TURKEY The life of a turkey before Thanksgiving is illustrative: the turkey is fed for 1,000 days and every day seems to conﬁrm that the farmer cares for it—until the last day, when conﬁdence is maximal. The “turkey problem” occurs when a naive analysis of stability is derived from the absence of past variations. Likewise, conﬁdence in stability was maximal at the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007. The turkey problem for humans is the result of mistaking one environment for another. Humans simultaneously inhabit two systems: the linear and the complex. The linear domain is characterized by its predictability and the low degree of interaction among its components, which allows the use of mathematical methods that make forecasts reliable. In complex systems, there is an absence of visible causal links between the elements, masking a high degree of interdependence and extremely low predictability. Nonlinear elements are also present, such as those commonly known, and generally misun- derstood, as “tipping points.” Imagine someone who keeps adding sand to a sand pile without any visible consequence, until suddenly the entire pile crumbles. It would be foolish to blame the collapse on the last grain of sand rather than the structure of the pile, but that is what people do consistently, and that is the policy error. U.S. President Barack Obama may blame an intelligence failure for the gov- ernment’s not foreseeing the revolution in Egypt (just as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter blamed an intelligence failure for his administration’s not fore- seeing the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran), but it is the suppressed risk in the statis- tical tails that matters—not the failure to see the last grain of sand. As a result of complicated interdependence and conta- gion eªects, in all man-made complex systems, a small number of possible events dominate, namely, Black Swans. Engineering, architecture, astronomy, most of physics, and much of common science are linear domains. The complex domain is the realm of the social world, epidemics, and economics. Crucially, the linear domain delivers mild variations without large shocks, whereas the complex domain delivers massive jumps and gaps. Complex systems are misunderstood, mostly because humans’ sophistication, obtained over the history of human knowl- edge in the linear domain, does not transfer properly to the complex domain. Humans can predict a solar eclipse and the trajectory of a space vessel, but not the stock market or Egyptian political events. All man-made complex systems have commonalities and even universalities. Sadly, deceptive calm (followed by Black Swan surprises) seems to be one of those properties. THE ERROR OF PREDICTION As with a crumbling sand pile, it would be foolish to attribute the collapse of a fragile bridge to the last truck that crossed it, and even more foolish to try to predict in advance which truck might bring it down. The system is responsible, not the compo- nents. But after the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–8, many people thought that predict- ing the subprime meltdown would have helped. It would not have, since it was a symptom of the crisis, not its underlying cause. Likewise, Obama’s blaming “bad in- telligence” for his administration’s failure to predict the crisis in Egypt is symptomatic of both the misunderstanding of complex systems and the bad policies involved. Obama’s mistake illustrates the illusion of local causal chains—that is, confusing catalysts for causes and assuming that one can know which catalyst will produce which eªect. The ﬁnal episode of the upheaval in Egypt was unpredictable for all observers, especially those involved. As such, blam- ing the ciais as foolish as funding it to forecast such events. Governments are wasting billions of dollars on attempting to predict events that are produced by interdependent systems and are therefore not statistically understandable at the individual level. As Mark Abdollahian of Sentia Group, one of the contractors who sell predictive analytics to the U.S. government, noted regarding Egypt, policymakers should “think of this like Las Vegas. In blackjack, if you can do four percent better than the average, you’re making real money.” But the analogy is spurious. There is no “four percent better” on Egypt. This is not just money wasted but the construction of a false conﬁdence based on an erroneous focus. It is telling that the intelligence analysts made the same mistake as the risk-management systems that failed to predict the economic crisis—and oªered the exact same excuses when they failed. Political and economic “tail events” are unpredictable, and their probabilities are not scientiﬁcally measurable. No matter how many dollars are spent on research, predicting revolutions is not the same as counting cards; humans will never be able to turn politics into the tractable random- ness of blackjack. Most explanations being oªered for the current turmoil in the Middle East follow the “catalysts as causes” confusion. The riots in Tunisia and Egypt were initially attributed to rising commodity prices, not to stiﬂing and unpopular dictatorships. But Bahrain and Libya are countries with high gdps that can aªord to import grain and other commodities. Again, the focus is wrong even if the logic is comforting. It is the system and its fragility, not events, that must be studied—what physicists call “percolation theory,” in which the proper- ties of the terrain are studied rather than those of a single element of the terrain. When dealing with a system that is inherently unpredictable, what should be done? Diªerentiating between two types of countries is useful. In the ﬁrst, changes in government do not lead to meaningful diªerences in political outcomes (since political tensions are out in the open). In the second type, changes in govern- ment lead to both drastic and deeply unpredictable changes. Consider that Italy, with its much- maligned “cabinet instability,” is economi- cally and politically stable despite having had more than 60 governments since World War II (indeed, one may say Italy’s stability is because of these switches of government). Similarly, in spite of consis- tently bad press, Lebanon is a relatively safe bet in terms of how far governments can jump from equilibrium; in spite of all the noise, shifting alliances, and street protests, changes in government there tend to be comparatively mild. For exam- ple, a shift in the ruling coalition from Christian parties to Hezbollah is not such a consequential jump in terms of the country’s economic and political stability. Switching equilibrium, with control of the government changing from one party to another, in such systems acts as a shock absorber. Since a single party cannot have total and more than temporary control, the possibility of a large jump in the regime type is constrained. In contrast, consider Iran and Iraq. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Sad- dam Hussein both constrained volatility by any means necessary. In Iran, when the shah was toppled, the shift of power to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was a huge, unforeseeable jump. After the fact, analysts could construct convincing accounts about how killing Iranian Communists, driving the left into exile, demobilizing the demo- cratic opposition, and driving all dissent into the mosque had made Khomeini’s rise inevitable. In Iraq, the United States removed the lid and was actually surprised to ﬁnd that the regime did not jump from hyperconstraint to something like France. But this was impossible to predict ahead of time due to the nature of the system itself. What can be said, however, is that the more constrained the volatility, the bigger the regime jump is likely to be. From the French Revolution to the triumph of the Bolsheviks, history is replete with such examples, and yet somehow humans remain unable to process what they mean. THE FEAR OF RANDOMNESS Humans fear randomness—a healthy ancestral trait inherited from a diªerent environment. Whereas in the past, which was a more linear world, this trait enhanced ﬁtness and increased chances of survival, it can have the reverse eªect in today’s complex world, making volatility take the shape of nasty Black Swans hiding behind deceptive periods of “great moderation.” This is not to say that any and all volatility should be embraced. Insurance should not be banned, for example. But alongside the “catalysts as causes” confusion sit two mental biases: the illusion of control and the action bias (the illusion that doing something is always better than doing nothing). This leads to the desire to impose man-made solutions. Greenspan’s actions were harmful, but it would have been hard to justify inaction in a democracy where the incentive is to always promise a better outcome than the other guy, regard- less of the actual, delayed cost. Variation is information. When there is no variation, there is no information. This explains the cia’s failure to predict the Egyptian revolution and, a generation before, the Iranian Revolution—in both cases, the revolutionaries themselves did not have a clear idea of their relative strength with respect to the regime they were hoping to topple. So rather than sub- sidize and praise as a “force for stability” every tin-pot potentate on the planet, the U.S. government should encourage countries to let information ﬂow upward through the transparency that comes with political agitation. It should not fear ﬂuc- tuations per se, since allowing them to be in the open, as Italy and Lebanon both show in diªerent ways, creates the stability of small jumps. As Seneca wrote in De clementia, “Repeated punishment, while it crushes the hatred of a few, stirs the hatred of all . . . just as trees that have been trimmed throw out again countless branches.” The imposition of peace through repeated punishment lies at the heart of many seemingly intractable conﬂicts, including the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate. Further- more, dealing with seemingly reliable high-level officials rather than the people themselves prevents any peace treaty signed from being robust. The Romans were wise enough to know that only a free man under Roman law could be trusted to engage in a contract; by extension, only a free people can be trusted to abide by a treaty. Treaties that are negotiated with the consent of a broad swath of the populations on both sides of a conﬂict tend to survive. Just as no central bank is powerful enough to dictate stability, no superpower can be powerful enough to guarantee solid peace alone. U.S. policy toward the Middle East has historically, and especially since 9/11, been unduly focused on the repression of any and all political ﬂuctuations in the name of preventing “Islamic fundamentalism”— a trope that Mubarak repeated until his last moments in power and that Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddaﬁ continues to emphasize today, blaming Osama bin Laden for what has befallen him. This is wrong. The West and its autocratic Arab allies have strengthened Islamic funda- mentalists by forcing them underground, and even more so by killing them. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau put it, “A little bit of agitation gives motivation to the soul, and what really makes the species prosper is not peace so much as freedom.” With freedom comes some unpredictable ﬂuctuation. This is one of life’s packages: there is no freedom without noise—and no stability without volatility.∂

#### Prefer our disjunctive scenarios to their short-term conjunctive scenarios.

Yudkowsky 6 – Research Fellow & Director @ Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence (Eliezer, 8/31/. Palo Alto, CA. “Cognitive biases potentially affecting judgment of global risks,” Forthcoming in Global Catastrophic Risks, eds. Nick Bostrom and Milan Cirkovic, singinst.org/upload/cognitive-biases.pdf)

The conjunction fallacy similarly applies to futurological forecasts. Two independent sets of professional analysts at the Second International Congress on Forecasting were asked to rate, respectively, the probability of "A complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983" or "A Russian invasion of Poland, and a complete suspension of diplomatic relations between the USA and the Soviet Union, sometime in 1983". The second set of analysts responded with significantly higher probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1983.) In Johnson et. al. (1993), MBA students at Wharton were scheduled to travel to Bangkok as part of their degree program. Several groups of students were asked how much they - 6 - were willing to pay for terrorism insurance. One group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the flight from Thailand to the US. A second group of subjects was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance covering the round-trip flight. A third group was asked how much they were willing to pay for terrorism insurance that covered the complete trip to Thailand. These three groups responded with average willingness to pay of $17.19, $13.90, and $7.44 respectively. According to probability theory, adding additional detail onto a story must render the story less probable. It is less probable that Linda is a feminist bank teller than that she is a bank teller, since all feminist bank tellers are necessarily bank tellers. Yet human psychology seems to follow the rule that adding an additional detail can make the story more plausible. People might pay more for international diplomacy intended to prevent nanotechnological warfare by China, than for an engineering project to defend against nanotechnological attack from any source. The second threat scenario is less vivid and alarming, but the defense is more useful because it is more vague. More valuable still would be strategies which make humanity harder to extinguish without being specific to nanotechnologic threats - such as colonizing space, or see Yudkowsky (this volume) on AI. Security expert Bruce Schneier observed (both before and after the 2005 hurricane in New Orleans) that the U.S. government was guarding specific domestic targets against "movie-plot scenarios" of terrorism, at the cost of taking away resources from emergency-response capabilities that could respond to any disaster. (Schneier 2005.) Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, **people tend to overestimate the probability that**, e.g., **seven events of 90% probability will all occur**. Conversely, **people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur**. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses - 7 - a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions.' The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this book - or some other cause which none of us foresaw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

#### And biopower is a disad to predictions - our second shaw and akter evidence indicates that totalizing representations of the world make the world killable – informationalizes and anticipates threats – that’s an extinction level disad to their predictive assumptions

#### We don’t have to win that all threats are socially constructed just that some are – the Hossezin evidence indicates that power sows threats to induce rally around the flag – means that you can’t determine the truth value of their impacts because they are always determined by power.

## T

#### No ground loss – structural disads linked to the whole government provide ground

#### No resolutional basis – it only says US Federal Government – anything more is infinitely regressive and unpredictable

#### Agent counterplans are bad – they detract from topic-specific education, focus on stale issues and steal Aff ground by doing all of the plan

#### Counter-interpretation – normal means should determine agents. This is best – it allows the Neg to read evidence to get links to disads and increases research about the topic.

#### Not a voting issue – if they win this it just means we should be forced to specify.

#### Potential abuse isn’t a voting issue – actual abuse can be countered where it occurs.

#### A2: Conditional

#### Plan isn’t conditional – we’ll always defend it gets implemented

#### A2: T-Resolved

#### Resolved isn’t in the resolution – its just an anachronistic precursor

#### We’re resolved – we’ll defend the plan as always being implemented

#### A2: No Solvency

#### Doesn’t take out solvency – the whole USFG acts guaranteeing the plan is implemented

## CP

### CP generic

#### Risk of the net benefit proves the solvency deficit - Dillon critiques sovereign calculation - that’s the neg’s reduction of life to solvency and net benefits - puts the judge on the throne, enforcing the subjectivity that guarantees the zero point and turns the cp.

#### More evidence - cost benefit analysis is uniquely devaluing

**Kelman, 81** [Steven, Albert J. Weatherhead III and Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Public Management at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique” AEI Journal on Government and Society Regulation, 33-40]

Finally, one may oppose the effort to place prices on a non-market thing and hence in effect incorporate it into the market system out of a fear that the very act of doing so will reduce the thing's perceived value. To place a price on the benefit may, in other words, reduce the value of that benefit. Cost-benefit analysis thus may be like the thermometer that, when placed in a liquid to be measured, itself changes the liquid's temperature. Examples of the perceived cheapening of a thing's value by the very act of buying and selling it abound in everyday life and language. The disgust that accompanies the idea of buying and selling human beings is based on the sense that this would dramatically diminish human worth. Epithets such as "he prostituted himself," applied as linguistic analogies to people who have sold something, reflect the view that certain things should not be sold because doing so diminishes their value. Praise that is bought is worth little, even to the person buying it. A true anecdote is told of an economist who retired to another university community and complained that he was having difficulty making friends. The laconic response of a critical colleague-"If you want a friend why don't you buy yourself one"-illustrates in a pithy way the intuition that, for some things, the very act of placing a price on them reduces their perceived value.

The first reason that pricing something de- creases its perceived value is that, in many circumstances, non-market exchange is associated with the production of certain values not associated with market exchange. These may include spontaneity and various other feelings that come from personal relationships. If a good becomes less associated with the production of positively valued feelings because of market exchange, the perceived value of the good declines to the extent that those feelings are valued. This can be seen clearly in instances where a thing may be transferred both by market and by non-market mechanisms. The willingness to pay for sex bought from a prostitute is less than the perceived value of the sex con- summating love. (Imagine the reaction if a practitioner of cost-benefit analysis computed the benefits of sex based on the price of prostitute services.)

Furthermore, if one values in a general sense the existence of a non-market sector be- cause of its connection with the production of certain valued feelings, then one ascribes added value to any non-marketed good simply as a repository of values represented by the non- market sector one wishes to preserve. This seems certainly to be the case for things in nature, such as pristine streams or undisturbed forests: for many people who value them, part of their value comes from their position as repositories of values the non-market sector represents.

### Exec CP

#### Perm do both– executive can issue an order and be restricted – shields the link on the net benefit because it means Obama doesn’t fight the disad

#### They obviously can’t solve - Lauritsen argues that the sovereign calls all the shots – obviously if Obama has total power and decides to not use some of it that doesn’t solve sovereign violence.

#### More ev

Lauritsen 2010 [Holger Ross Aarhus University “Democracy and the Separation of Powers: A Rancièrean Approach,” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory, found via ebscohost, 15-16]

Such a democratic point of view could, for example, be that of Rousseau who, as has been shown, is also aware of the possibility that an actual dictatorship of the executive power co-exists with a formal subordination of the executive to the legislative power. Such a dictatorship, however, is not considered by Rousseau to be the truth of the formal subordination (which would be a metapolitical interpretation), but rather to be an anti–democratic tendency inherent in the latter. As he puts it, ‘all governments of the world, once they are invested with the public force, sooner or later usurp the Sovereign authority’ (Rousseau, 1997: 119). In Schmitt’s terminology, one could say that the state of exception is an inherent tendency in the constitutional structure where the executive is formally subordinated to, but nevertheless separated from, the legislative power. This formulation indeed sums up a plausible both non-metapolitical and democratic conception of the relationship between the principle of subordination of powers and the omnipotence of the executive power. Pannekoek regarded this omnipotence as the truth of the principle of separation of powers. Schmitt regarded it as a necessary and recurrent exception, the emergence of which should be facilitated. Inspired by Rousseau, the claim here is that the omnipotence of the executive power is a tendency which ought to be counteracted.

A great advantage of conceiving of the omnipotence of the executive power as a tendency and not as a hidden truth is that it opens up for an evaluation of different political developments and events, an evaluation that a metapolitical approach does not allow for. At a particular historical point of a particular state, the question can be asked: has the executive power usurped the legislative power? For instance Agamben claims that the present political situation of the Western world is, to a very large extent, characterized by exactly such a usurpation. As an example, he mentions the transfer of authority from laws to decrees that has taken place in Italy: ‘[…] law-decrees now constitute the normal form of legislation […]. This means that the democratic principle of the separation of powers has today collapsed and that the executive power has in fact, at least partially, absorbed the legislative power’ (Agamben, 2003: 18). Other theorists have also remarked the expansion of the executive power at the expense of the legislative power. The German political scientist Klaus von Beyme points at the growing power of ‘expert committees’ and at the tendency of the government to be the unique initiator of law making (Beyme, 2000: 91). It could be added that the latter tendency, depicted by Beyme on a national level, seems to be institutionalized in the EU where the executive branch, that is, the commission, alone has the legislative initiative.

While a theorist such as Beyme does not seem to have any critical purpose with his diagnosis, the American law scholar Oren Gross explicitly deplores the ‘aggrandizement of executive power’ (Gross, 2006: 83). Moreover, like Agamben, Gross compares this development with the extension of the executive power that, in periods of crisis, happens by means of the installation of a state of exception. Agamben, however, differs from both Beyme, Gross and other political scientists on an important point. In fact, the explicit purpose of the analysis elaborated in State of Exception, and in general in Agamben’s works, is to ‘answer the question that never ceases to reverberate in the history of Western politics: what does it mean to act politically?’ (Agamben, 2003: 2).4 In other words, Agamben does not only wish to describe and deplore the present tendency in the relationship between the legislative and the executive power, his purpose is also and principally to deﬁne a political practice that can counteract this tendency. It should be reminded that according to the discussion above, exactly such a practice was hinted at but not further described by Rousseau in his considerations about how the general will can maintain its control of the government.

#### And that means they can’t exert the political will of enforcing separation of powers – means they can’t solve the aff impact.

#### And the aff is an impact turn - Dillon critiques sovereign calculation - that’s the neg – calculation reduces life to solvency and net benefits - puts the judge on the throne, enforcing the subjectivity that guarantees violence and turns the cp.

#### More evidence - cost benefit analysis is uniquely devaluing

**Kelman, 81** [Steven, Albert J. Weatherhead III and Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Public Management at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, “Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique” AEI Journal on Government and Society Regulation, 33-40]

Finally, one may oppose the effort to place prices on a non-market thing and hence in effect incorporate it into the market system out of a fear that the very act of doing so will reduce the thing's perceived value. To place a price on the benefit may, in other words, reduce the value of that benefit. Cost-benefit analysis thus may be like the thermometer that, when placed in a liquid to be measured, itself changes the liquid's temperature. Examples of the perceived cheapening of a thing's value by the very act of buying and selling it abound in everyday life and language. The disgust that accompanies the idea of buying and selling human beings is based on the sense that this would dramatically diminish human worth. Epithets such as "he prostituted himself," applied as linguistic analogies to people who have sold something, reflect the view that certain things should not be sold because doing so diminishes their value. Praise that is bought is worth little, even to the person buying it. A true anecdote is told of an economist who retired to another university community and complained that he was having difficulty making friends. The laconic response of a critical colleague-"If you want a friend why don't you buy yourself one"-illustrates in a pithy way the intuition that, for some things, the very act of placing a price on them reduces their perceived value.

The first reason that pricing something de- creases its perceived value is that, in many circumstances, non-market exchange is associated with the production of certain values not associated with market exchange. These may include spontaneity and various other feelings that come from personal relationships. If a good becomes less associated with the production of positively valued feelings because of market exchange, the perceived value of the good declines to the extent that those feelings are valued. This can be seen clearly in instances where a thing may be transferred both by market and by non-market mechanisms. The willingness to pay for sex bought from a prostitute is less than the perceived value of the sex con- summating love. (Imagine the reaction if a practitioner of cost-benefit analysis computed the benefits of sex based on the price of prostitute services.)

Furthermore, if one values in a general sense the existence of a non-market sector be- cause of its connection with the production of certain valued feelings, then one ascribes added value to any non-marketed good simply as a repository of values represented by the non- market sector one wishes to preserve. This seems certainly to be the case for things in nature, such as pristine streams or undisturbed forests: for many people who value them, part of their value comes from their position as repositories of values the non-market sector represents.

#### Perm do the CP – its an example of the president complying with the plans’ restriction

#### 7. Counterplan is a voter

#### A) Topic education – shifts the focus of the debate from whether the president should have the authority and to whether the president should be the person to stop it – causes stale debate about process

#### B) Fairness- steals the entirety off the aff and makes it impossible to generate offense

#### C) Object fiat – fiats the object of the resolution which makes clash impossible- no way to have a stable source of aff offense

#### Deference bad -- security k-ish stuff

Gross 3 -- Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School (Oren, 2/13/2003, "Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?" <http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/112-5/GrossFINAL.pdf>)

There exists a tension of “tragic dimensions” between democratic values and responses to emergencies. 58 Democratic nations faced with serious terrorist threats must “maintain and protect life, the liberties necessary to a vibrant democracy, and th e unity of the society, the loss of which can turn a healthy and diverse nation into a seriously divided and violent one.” 59 At the same time, exigenci es and acute crises directly challenge the most fundamental conc epts of constitutional democracy. The question then arises to what extent, if any, violations of fundamental democratic values can be justified in the name of the survival of the democratic, constitutional order itself; and if they can be justified, to what extent a democratic, constitutional gove rnment can defend the state without transforming itself into an authoritarian regime. Take, for example, the notion that a government must be of limited powers, a government of laws, not of men (or women). 60¶ When an extreme exigency arises it almost invariably leads to the strengthening of the executive branch not only at the expense of the other two branches, but also at the expense of individual rights, liberties, and freedoms. The government’s ability to act swiftly, secretly, and decisively against a threat to the life of the nation becomes supe rior to the ordinary principles of limitation on governmental powers and individual rights. 61 Crises tend to result in the expansion of governmental powers, the concentration of powers in the hands of the executive, and the concomitant contraction of individual freedoms and liberties. 62 Enhanced and newly created powers are asserted by, and given to, the government as necessary to meet the challenge to the community. Concepts such as separation of powers and federalism are likely to be among the first casualties when a nation needs to respond to a national emergency, as by engaging in a war against terrorism. 63 The executive branch assumes a leading role in countering the crisis, with the other two branches pu shed aside (whether of their own volition or not). 64 The increase in governmental powers leads, in turn, to a contraction of traditional individual rights, freedoms, and liberties. 65 While such expansions and concentrations of powers are not unique to times of crisis, but rather are part of the modernization of society and the need for governmental involvement in an eve r-growing number of areas of human activity, 66 it can hardly be denied that such phenomena have been accelerated tremendously (and, at times, initiated) during emergencies. 67¶ Our acceptance of the growing role of the executive branch as natural may be attributed, in part, to our conditioning during times of emergency. Thus, two seemingly antithetical vectors are in a constant tug-of-war. The existence of restrictions and li mitations on governmental powers is a fundamental attribute of democratic regimes. The ideals of democracy, individual rights, legitimacy, accountability, and the rule of law suggest that even in times of acute danger, govern ment is limited, both formally and substantively, in the range of activities that it may pursue in order to protect the state. However, grave terrorist threats directly challenge this organizing principle. The notion of raison d’état privileges the exercise of a wide panoply of measures by the state faced with challenges to its very existence. 68 Terrorists seek to exploit this fundamental conundrum facing their victims. In most cases, terrorist gr oups and organizations do not believe they can win by sheer force. They are no real physical or military match to well-organized states. 69 The threats they pose are not existential in the sense that they do not put in real danger the very existence of the victim state. Instead, terrorism presents its real threat in provoking democratic regimes to embrace and employ authoritarian measures 70 that (1) weaken the fabric of democracy; (2) discredit the government domestically as well as internationally; (3) alienate segments of the population from their government, thereby pushing more people to support (passively, if not outright actively) the terrorist organizations and their cause; and (4) undermine the government’s claim to th e moral higher ground in the battle against the terrorists, while gaining legitimacy for the latter. 71 The most critical danger from terrorism is “not that democracies would fail to defend themselves, but rather that they would (and did) do so far too well” and, in so doing, become “less democratic.” 72 This overreaction may result in the “barbarization” 73 of society not only in that terrorism from “below” may be transplanted by institutionalized terror from “above,” 74 but also in that use of power and force is legitimated as a means for settling disputes. 75

### Congress CP

#### Perm do the counterplan: it’s the aff’s judicial and or statutory restrictions.

#### And which actor not key – the lauritsen evidence indicates that the ideal and perception of separations of powers key to check sovereign authority

#### More evidence – negative focuses too much on macro-political drama – trades off with substantive strategization

**Kappeler 95** Associate Professor at Al-Akhawayn University (Susanne, The Will to Violence, p. 10-11)

We are the war' does not mean that the responsibility for a war is shared collectively and diffusely by an entire society which would be equivalent to exonerating warlords and politicians and profiteers or, as Ulrich Beck says, upholding the notion of `collective irresponsibility', where people are no longer held responsible for their actions, and where the conception of universal responsibility becomes the equival­ent of a universal acquittal.' On the contrary, the object is precisely to analyse the specific and differential responsibility of everyone in their diverse situations. Decisions to unleash a war are indeed taken at particular levels of power by those in a position to make them and to command such collective action. We need to hold them clearly responsible for their decisions and actions without lessening theirs by any collective `assumption' of responsibility. Yet our habit of focusing on the stage where the major dramas of power take place tends to obscure our sight in relation to our own sphere of competence, our own power and our own responsibility leading to the well-known illusion of our apparent `powerlessness’ and its accompanying phe­nomenon, our so-called political disillusionment. Single citizens even more so those of other nations have come to feel secure in their obvious non-responsibility for such large-scale political events as, say, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina or Somalia since the decisions for such events are always made elsewhere. Yet our insight that indeed we are not responsible for the decisions of a Serbian general or a Croatian president tends to mislead us into thinking that therefore we have no responsibility at all, not even for forming our own judgement, and thus into underrating the respons­ibility we do have within our own sphere of action. In particular, it seems to absolve us from having to try to see any relation between our own actions and those events, or to recognize the connections between those political decisions and our own personal decisions. It not only shows that we participate in what Beck calls `organized irresponsibility', upholding the apparent lack of connection between bureaucratically, institutionally, nationally and also individually or­ganized separate competences. It also proves the phenomenal and unquestioned alliance of our personal thinking with the thinking of the major powermongers: For we tend to think that we cannot `do' anything, say, about a war, because we deem ourselves to be in the wrong situation; because we are not where the major decisions are made. Which is why many of those not yet entirely disillusioned with politics tend to engage in a form of mental deputy politics, in the style of `What would I do if I were the general, the prime minister, the president, the foreign minister or the minister of defence?' Since we seem to regard their mega spheres of action as the only worthwhile and truly effective ones, and since our political analyses tend to dwell there first of all, any question of what I would do if I were indeed myself tends to peter out in the comparative insignificance of having what is perceived as `virtually no possibilities': what I could do seems petty and futile. For my own action I obviously desire the range of action of a general, a prime minister, or a General Secretary of the UN finding expression in ever more prevalent formulations like `I want to stop this war', `I want military intervention', `I want to stop this backlash', or `I want a moral revolution." 'We are this war', however, even if we do not command the troops or participate in so-called peace talks, namely as Drakulic says, in our `non-comprehension’: our willed refusal to feel responsible for our own thinking and for working out our own understanding, preferring innocently to drift along the ideological current of prefabricated arguments or less than innocently taking advantage of the advantages these offer. And we `are' the war in our `unconscious cruelty towards you', our tolerance of the `fact that you have a yellow form for refugees and I don't' our readiness, in other words, to build ident­ities, one for ourselves and one for refugees, one of our own and one for the `others'. We share in the responsibility for this war and its violence in the way we let them grow inside us, that is, in the way we shape `our feelings, our relationships, our values' according to the structures and the values of war and violence.

#### Counterplan is a voting issue

#### A) Topic education – shifts the focus of the debate from whether the president should have the authority and to who should be the person to stop it – causes stale debate about process

#### B) Fairness- steals the entirety off the aff and makes it impossible to generate offense

## Theory

#### Conditionality encourages shallow unfair debates – they’ll race to the under-covered position - deters good answers because they’ll just cross apply them – and reject the team – can’t reject the argument – voter for fairness and education

#### Judge conditionality even worse – no argumentative irresponsibility

## Politics

#### Not intrinsic – the supreme court can rule for the plan and \_\_\_ - key to effective decisionmaking

#### And even if they win that it’s intrinsic we think that disads and counterplans that are predicated on the temporal immediacy of the affirmative trade off with debating the substance of drone warfare and the resolution –

#### That does a disservice to debate as an activity because it causes us to focus more and more on the minutiae of implementation which is anti-educational because it misses the big picture

#### And politics disads uniquely bad for debate – it’s old, questionably true and the educational benefits are limited. All of their offense is solved by people reading the politics disad last year – means we can take a break for the next 3 – not an intrinsic disad because the link is pre-passage.

#### Econ resilient, US isn’t key, and impact empirically denied

**Lamy ’11**(Pascal Lamy is the Director-General of the World Trade Organization. Lamy is Honorary President of Paris-based think tank Notre Europe. Lamy graduated from the prestigious Sciences Po Paris, from HEC and ÉNA, graduating second in his year of those specializing in economics. “System Upgrade” BY PASCAL LAMY | APRIL 18, 2011)

**The** bigger **test came with** the 2008-2009 Great Recession, **the first** truly **global recession** since World War II. When the international economy went into free fall, trade went right along with it. Production and supply are today thoroughly global in nature, with most manufactured products made from parts and materials imported from many other countries. These global value chains have a multiplier effect on trade statistics, which explains why, as the global economy contracted by 2 percent in 2009, trade volume shrank by more than 12 percent. This multiplier effect works the other way around as well: **Growth returned** to 4.6 percent and trade volume grew by a record 14.5 percent over the course of 2010. **Projections for trade** in 2011 **are** also **strong**, with WTO economists predicting that trade volume will rise 6.5 percent during the current year. This sharp rebound in trade has proved two essential things: **Markets stayed open despite ever-stronger pressures** to close them, and trade is an indispensible tool for economic recovery, particularly for developing countries, which are more dependent on trade. Shortly after the crisis broke out, we in the WTO began to closely monitor the trade policy response of our member governments. Many were fearful that pressures to impose trade restrictions would prove too powerful for governments to resist. But this is not what happened. Instead, **the system of rules and disciplines**, agreed to over 60 years of negotiations, **held firm**. In **a series of reports** prepared for WTO members and the G-20, we found that **governments acted with great restraint**. At no time did the trade-restrictive measures imposed cover more than 2 percent of world imports. Moreover, the measures used -- anti-dumping duties, safeguards, and countervailing duties to offset export or production subsidies -- were those which, in the right circumstances, are permissible under WTO rules. I am not suggesting that every safeguard measure or countervailing duty imposed during those difficult days was in compliance with WTO rules, but responses to trade pressures were generally undertaken within an internationally agreed-upon framework. Countries by and large resisted overtly noncompliant measures, such as breaking legally binding tariff ceilings or imposing import bans or quotas. As **markets stayed open, trade flows began to shift**, **and countries** that shrugged off the impact of the crisis and **continued to grow** -- **notably China, India, and Brazil** -- **became ever-more attractive markets for countries that were struggling**, **including** those in Europe and **North America**. Trade has been a powerful engine for growth in the developing world, a fact reflected in the far greater trade-to-GDP ratios we see there. In 2010, developing countries' share of world trade expanded to a record 45 percent, and this trend looks set to continue. Decisions made in Brasilia, Beijing, and New Delhi to open their respective economies to trade have been instrumental in enabling these countries to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty.

#### Economic collapse predictions create self-fulfilling prophecies

Mckendrick 12 (Joe, Independent analyst who tracks the impact of information technology on management and markets, author of the SOA Manifesto, written for Forbes, ZDNet and Database Trends & Applications, 9/18/12, “Are economic downturns self-fulfilling prophecies,” <http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/business-brains/are-economic-downturns-self-fulfilling-prophecies/26329>)

There are tangible, and often painful, fundamentals that determine the course of the economy — unemployment, interest rates, housing prices, inflation, industrial production, government debt. But more than anything else, markets are psychology, and an atmosphere of fear and panic among producers and consumers leads to scaling back of purchases, which further exacerbates a downturn. Over the past few years in particular, there have been plenty of messages of impending doom circulating through the mass media. Like Eeyore, the miserable mule from Winnie-the-Pooh, many pundits ignore any bright spots and flood the airwaves with grim predictions of imminent collapse and despair just around the corner. In an economy heavily tied to consumer confidence, such talk could have far-reaching consequences. Such downbeat messages may eventually result in a self-fulfilling prophecy, actually translating into job losses. A new analysis by Sylvain Leduc and Zheng Liu, analysts at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco, says there is a statistically measurable impact from “talking down” the economy. The economists say that the atmosphere of uncertainty in the recent downturn of 2008-2009 added at least one to two percentage points to the unemployment rate: “During the Great Recession, the increase in uncertainty appears to have been much greater in magnitude…. Our model estimates that uncertainty has pushed up the U.S. unemployment rate by between one and two percentage points since the start of the financial crisis in 2008. To put this in perspective, had there been no increase in uncertainty in the past four years, the unemployment rate would have been closer to 6% or 7% than to the 8% to 9% actually registered.” Policymakers and pundits can’t be pollyanish in the face of economic troubles, of course. But the Fed authors suggest that as media channels fill up with dire and downbeat talk, fear levels go up, and people start to lose their jobs. “Heightened uncertainty acts like a decline in aggregate demand because it depresses economic activity and holds down inflation,” the Fed economists observe. Another thing is clear as well: when analysts and pundits put their Eeyore faces on, it doesn’t help anybody. What is needed is more discussion and ideas about solutions and disruptive innovation that create opportunities, improve our world, and provide people more control over their economic destiny.